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Abstract
How can we make machine learning provably robust against adversarial examples in
a scalable way? Since certified defense methods, which ensure -robust, consume
huge resources, they can only achieve small degree of robustness in practice.
Lipschitz margin training (LMT) is a scalable certified defense, but it can also only
achieve small robustness due to over-regularization. How can we make certified
defense more efficiently? We present LC-LMT, a light weight Lipschitz margin
training which solves the above problem. Our method has the following properties;
(a) efficient: it can achieve -robustness at early epoch, and (b) robust: it has a
potential to get higher robustness than LMT. In the evaluation, we demonstrate the
benefits of the proposed method. LC-LMT can achieve required robustness more
than 30 epoch earlier than LMT in MNIST, and shows more than 90 % accuracy
against both legitimate and adversarial inputs.
1 Introduction
Adversarial example is a crafted input for deceiving deep neural networks [10]. It is a potentially
critical safety issues in machine learning based autonomous systems like self-driving cars. How can
we make machine learning provably robust against adversarial examples?
One of simple defense approach against adversarial examples is to mask gradients [9]. However,
it provides a false sense of security [2] [1] [11]. Adversarial training [4] [5] [6], which injects
adversarial examples with correct labels into training samples, is a promising approach, but it is just a
countermeasure against collectable samples.
Recently, several certified robust learning approaches have been proposed [13] [7], but all of them
lack scalability. Thus, in a practical time, those method can only achieve small degree of robustness
even for low dimensional datasets. Lipschitz margin training (LMT) [12] is a scalable certified
defense, but it can also only achieve small degree of robustness due to over-regularization. How can
we make certified defense more efficiently?
We present LC-LMT, a lightweight Lipschitz margin training which solves the above problem. The
contributions of the proposed method are: (a) efficient: it can achieve -robustness at early epoch, and
(b) robust: it has a potential to get higher robustness than LMT. In the evaluation, we demonstrate the
benefits of the proposed method. LC-LMT can achieve required robustness more than 30 epoch earlier
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than LMT in MNIST, and shows more than 90 % accuracy against both legitimate and adversarial
inputs.
2 Preliminary
Here, we introduce essential notations, definitions and existing work to understand our proposal.
2.1 -robustness
-robustness is a certifiable metric representing robustness of a neural network against adversarial
examples.
Definition 1 (-robustness) Let Bp (x) = {x+ δ|‖δ‖p ≤ } denote the `p-ball of radius  around a
point x ∈ Rd. A neural network f is called -robust around a point x if f assigns the same class to
all points x˜ ∈ Bp (x).
This paper considers -robustness in `2-norm (p = 2) as well as [12].
2.2 Lipschitz Margin Training
Lipschitz Margin Training (LMT) is a scalable way to ensure -robustness based on the Lipschitz
constant [12]. Note that, we assume the last layer of f is softmax, and f(x) represents logits which is
output of the subnetwork before the softmax.
For all x and x+ δ, a neural network f is Lipschitz continuous if there exists a real constant Lf ≥ 0
such that
‖f(x)− f(x+ δ)‖2 ≤ Lf‖δ‖2. (1)
Lipschitz constant Lf represents sensitivity of f if the input is changed at most δ.
LMT also introduced a remarkable notation of prediction margin.
Definition 2 (Prediction Margin) Let x be an input image and t be the true label of x, the prediction
margin of x in f is computed as:
Mf,x := f(x)t −maxi 6=tf(x)i. (2)
LMT enlarges the prediction margin around each input x to be -robustness. The prediction margin
to satisfy -robustness for x is derived in [12] as follows:
Mf,x ≥
√
2Lf . (3)
Therefore, we need at least β =
√
2Lf  between true class and the others to make f around each
x -robust. In the training phase, LMT inflates each f(x)i except f(x)t. The algorithm of LMT is
described in Algorithm 1.
The above inflation has an effect like regularization towards obtaining the margin to be -robust. LMT
can achieve -robustness in a scalable way through this regularized training. However, we found that
it has an issue like over-regularization in case either  and Lf is large. Due to the issue, LMT tends to
slowly forward training. Thus, it consumes lots of epochs to get the required margin and may cause
under-fitting. Actually, LMT is hard to achieve -robustness with  ≥ 0.5 even in MNIST.
3 Proposed Method
We propose low-cost Lipschitz margin training (LC-LMT) to solve the above problem. We introduce
a limited inflation to make network f -robust more efficiently.
Let v be the class whose score f(x)v is the highest in all f(x)i where i 6= t. If the gap f(x)t− f(x)v
is larger than β, all gaps between t and i( 6= t) satisfy (3).
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Algorithm 1 Lipschitz Margin Training [12]
Input: , image x, label t
1: y ← Forward(x)
2: Lf ← CalcLipschitzConst()
3: for all i 6= t do
4: yi ← yi +
√
2Lf 
5: end for
6: p← SoftmaxIfNeccesary(y)
7: `← CalcLoss(p, t)
Algorithm 2 LC-LMT
Input: , image x, label t
1: y ← Forward(x)
2: Lf ← CalcLipschitzConst()
3: v ← arg max
i6=t
f(x)i
4: yv ← yv +
√
2Lf 
5: p← SoftmaxIfNeccesary(y)
6: `← CalcLoss(p, t)
Based on the above idea, we freight the inflation value β only at v. In the training phase, the inflation
has an effect of increasing the score f(x)t to be -robust around x (Algorithm 2).
Our proposed method LC-LMT only inflates the score f(x)v , but LMT inflates all except t. Then, the
rank of t in f(x) can be changed at most 1 in LC-LMT, at most number of classes - 1 in LMT. Since
softmax activation tends to depress lower rank values into zero, the chance of the depression of t in
LMT is higher than LC-LMT. Thus, in terms of regularization, the regularization cost of LC-LMT is
thought of as smaller than LMT. The volume of the cost may be related with sum of inflated values
and number of inflated classes. The theoretical analysis about the above discussion is a future work.
4 Evaluation
In this section we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method LC-LMT. The experiments
were designed to answer following questions:
Q1 Efficiency: How early is our method in achieving -robustness?
Q2 Robustness: How accurate is our method in classifying adversarial inputs?
Experimental setting. We used MNIST and SVHN [8] for the evaluations. For MNIST, we used
a neural network having 4 fully-connected layer with ReLU activation and softmax at output layer.
Each hidden layer has 100 parameters. For SVHN, we used WideResnet [14] with 16 layers and
width factor 4 following [3]. Computation of Lipschitz constant follows LMT. To generate adversarial
examples, we employed (L2-) Carlini Wagner attack (CW attack) [2] with 100 iterations.
4.1 Efficiency
We now evaluate efficiency of proposed method. Here, we employed MNIST and  = 1.0.
First, we show how early is our method in enlarging margin which satisfies (3). Figure 1a shows the
enlarged margin and required bound in average for each method. LC-LMT has been satisfied the
(a) Margin@epoch (b) Loss@epoch
Figure 1: LC-LMT is efficient. LC-LMT achieves (3) at early epoch.
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(a) MNIST (b) SVHN
Figure 2: LC-LMT is robust. LC-LMT classifies adversarial inputs more correctly.
Table 1: Accuracy against legitimate inputs [SVHN]
LMT (0.2) LMT (1.0) LC-LMT (0.2) LC-LMT (1.0) non-robust
Accuracy (Train) 0.500 0.335 0.933 0.911 0.984
Accuracy (Test) 0.785 0.700 0.936 0.912 0.975
required bound since 5th epoch. While, LMT satisfied it around 35th epoch. Thus, our proposed
method LC-LMT can satisfy (3) at very early epoch.
Next, we show how early is our method in reducing loss. Figure 1b shows loss value at each epoch.
LC-LMT shows dramatical loss drops at very early epoch similar to non-robust learning. However,
LMT cannot reduce loss in first 30 epoch. Since the difference between both methods are number of
inflations on logits, the size of overall inflations might be a key to be efficient.
The above two results suggest that our proposed method provide efficient robust training.
4.2 Robustness
Next, we measure robustness. Figures 2a and 2b plot classification accuracy against adversarial
examples along with `2-norm of perturbations. We run LMT and LC-LMT in 100 epochs.
Figure 2a shows accuracy against adversarial examples for MNIST. LC-LMT shows high accuracy
as well as non-robust learning against very small perturbed inputs whose norm of perturbations is
less than 1. LMT (0.2), which is LMT at  = 0.2, also shows good accuracy, but LMT (0.5) cannot
correctly classify at all. For large perturbed inputs, LC-LMT shows good accuracy in proportional
to . However, LC-LMT (2.0) and LC-LMT (10.0) do not satisfy their robustness demands. Those
demands might be too large to build classifiers with using MNIST. Anyway, those results suggest that
LC-LMT has a potential to make machine learning more robust than LMT. LC-LMT still works at
 = 10 for MNIST.
On SVHN, Figure 2b shows that LC-LMT get higher accuracy than LMT until norm of perturbations
< 0.7, but LMT is slightly better after 0.7. Table 1 shows training accuracy and test accuracy in each
setting. The table suggests that LC-LMT shows accuracies close to both training data and test data,
but LMT is neither of them. The above results demonstrate that our proposed method LC-LMT is
accurate for both legitimate and adversarial inputs.
5 Conclusion
We proposed LC-LMT, a low cost Lipschitz margin training. Our method has the following advan-
tages; (a) efficient: it can achieve -robustness at early epoch, and (b) robust: it has a potential to
get higher robustness than LMT. Evaluation showed that LC-LMT achieved required robustness
in very early epochs, and it demonstrated more than 90 % accuracy against both legitimate and
adversarial inputs. In the future works, we tackle theoretical analysis of the proposed method and the
relationships between LMT and the other Lipschitz based works.
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